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Kokesh Footnote Three Notwithstanding: 
The Future of the Disgorgement Penalty in SEC Cases 
Stephen M. Bainbridge* 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) long has relied on 
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains as a principal penalty in civil securities 
fraud litigation, especially in insider trading cases brought under Securities 
Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.1 Curiously, however, it has 
done so despite the absence of any statutory authorization for the 
disgorgement penalty.2 In the absence of a statutory framework, the courts 
have had to flesh out the substantive and procedural aspects of 
disgorgement via interstitial lawmaking. In Kokesh v. SEC,3 the U.S. 
Supreme Court continued that process by taking up the seemingly 
technical—but surprisingly important4—question of what statute of 
limitations applies to SEC disgorgement actions. In doing so, however, the 
Court’s opinion actually cast considerable doubt on the validity of the 
seemingly well-established disgorgement sanction.5 
 
 
* William D. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. My thanks to 
Kevin Gerson and Jodi Kruger of the UCLA Law Library for their valuable assistance with 
researching this topic. I also thank Theresa Gabaldon and Sung Hui Kim for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft. Responsibility for any errors, of course, is mine alone. 
1 See, e.g., SEC v. Henke, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (describing 
disgorgement as one of the SEC’s “traditional equitable remedies”). 
2 See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (explaining that 
“disgorgement is rather routinely ordered for insider trading violations despite a similar lack of 
specific authorizations for that remedy under the securities law”). 
3 Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). 
4  For a discussion of the importance of that issue, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Outcome of 
Recently Argued “Kokesh” SCOTUS Case Will Impact SEC’s Use of Potent Disgorgement Authority, 
WLF LEGAL PULSE (April 25, 2017), https://wlflegalpulse.com/2017/04/25/outcome-of-recently-
argued-kokesh-scotus-case-will-impact-secs-use-of-potent-disgorgement-authority/. 
5 See, e.g., Andrew J. Morris, “Kokesh v. SEC”: Its Wide-Ranging (and Mostly Good) 
Implications for Disgorgement Actions, WLF LEGAL PULSE (June 14, 2017), https://wlflegalpulse.com 
/2017/06/14/kokesh-v-sec-its-wide-ranging-and-mostly-good-implications-for-disgorgement-actions/ 
(“Kokesh raises . . . the threshold question of whether the SEC has the authority to obtain any 
disgorgement at all.”). Prior to this holding, the law was thought to be well-established.  See, e.g., SEC 
v. Yun, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1290 (M.D. Fla. 2001) ("As the SEC notes, disgorgement is usually 
considered rather routine; if a person is found to have violated the securities laws, and profited from 
the ensuing transaction, courts simply order the disgorgement of those profits."); SEC v. Novus 
Techs., LLC, No. 2:07-CV-235-TC, 2010 WL 4180550, at *40 (D. Utah Oct. 20, 2010), aff'd sub nom; 
SEC v. Thompson, 732 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2013) ("It is well settled that the SEC may seek, and 
courts may order, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains in SEC injunctive actions."). 
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I. THE KOKESH CASE 
 
Charles Kokesh owned and controlled a pair of investment adviser 
firms that, in turn, managed four business development corporations 
(BDCs).6 Both the investment advisers and the BDCs were registered with 
the SEC. The SEC alleged that Kokesh misappropriated almost $35 
million from the BDCs for the benefit of himself and the investment 
adviser firms.7 After a civil trial, a jury agreed that Kokesh had 
fraudulently misappropriated the funds.8 The trial judge ordered Kokesh to 
disgorge $34.9 million, which it found “reasonably approximates the ill-
gotten gains causally connected to Defendant’s violations.”9 
Because there is no statute of limitations explicitly applicable to 
disgorgement proceedings, the defendant argued that the generic federal 
five-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applied.10 This 
statute applies to any “action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of 
any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise,” for which 
Congress has not provided a specific statute of limitations.11 Kokesh 
argued that disgorgement is a penalty or forfeiture within the meaning of 
section 2462 and, because the events in question had taken place more 
than five years previously, the statute time-barred the SEC action.12 
 
6 The facts are drawn from the lower court opinion, SEC v. Kokesh, 834 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 
2016), rev'd sub nom. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). 
7 See id. at 1161 (“From 1995 through 2006, Defendant directed the Advisers' treasurer to take 
$23.8 million from the Funds to pay salaries and bonuses to officers of the Advisers (which included 
Defendant himself) and to take $5 million to cover the Advisers' office rent. In 2000 he also caused the 
Advisers to take $6.1 million in payments described as “tax distributions” in SEC reports that he 
signed.”). 
8 See id. (summarizing the jury verdicts). 
9 Id. 
10 See id. at 1162 (“Defendant argues that . . . the disgorgement order is a penalty or forfeiture 
within the meaning of § 2462.”). 
11 28 U.S.C. § 2462. 
12 Kokesh was also subject to a permanent injunction against “directly or indirectly violating 
section 206(1) and (2) of the Investment Advisers Act; section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and 
Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13; section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act 
Rule 14a-9; section 37 of the Investment Company Act, and Section 205(a) of the Investment Advisers 
Act.” Id. at 1162. He claimed that the injunction was also subject to the section 2462 limitation period. 
The Tenth Circuit dismissed that argument almost out of hand, observing that “[w]e fail to see how an 
order to obey the law is a penalty.” Id. Kokesh did not seek Supreme Court review of that aspect of the 
case. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kokesh v. S.E.C., 2016 WL 6124409 (U.S. 2016) (No. 16-
529) (“The question presented is: Does the five-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 apply to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/8
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The Tenth Circuit rejected that argument, holding that disgorgement is 
a remedy rather than a penalty, explaining that, “[p]roperly applied, the 
disgorgement remedy does not inflict punishment.”13 Although the Tenth 
Circuit agreed that “disgorgement serves a deterrent purpose,” the court 
further explained that “it does so only by depriving the wrongdoer of the 
benefits of wrongdoing.”14  
The Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opinion by Justice 
Sotomayor.15  Importantly, the Court went out of its way to note that 
disgorgement is a relatively new penalty that was created by judicial fiat at 
the SEC’s behest: 
Initially, the only statutory remedy available to the SEC in an 
enforcement action was an injunction barring future violations of 
securities laws. . . . In the absence of statutory authorization for 
monetary remedies, the Commission urged courts to order 
disgorgement as an exercise of their “inherent equity power to grant 
relief ancillary to an injunction.”16 
Somewhat later in the opinion the Court dropped a footnote (number 
three), stating that: 
Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on 
whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC 
enforcement proceedings or on whether courts have properly 
applied disgorgement principles in this context. The sole question 
presented in this case is whether disgorgement, as applied in SEC 
enforcement actions, is subject to [section] 2462’s limitations 
period.17 
The footnote is an apparent nod to the concerns several justices raised 
at oral argument about the scope of the SEC’s authority and the power of 
 
claims for ‘disgorgement’?”). 
13 Kokesh, 834 F.3d at 1164. 
14 Id. 
15 Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). 
16 Id. at 1640 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971)) (citation omitted). 
17 Id. at 1642 n.3. 
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courts with respect to disgorgement.18 Despite its seeming neutrality on 
the question, footnote three “all but invites [future] defendants to make a 
challenge” to the validity of the disgorgement sanction.19 After all, “when 
the Supreme Court says, ‘We’re not expressing an opinion on x,’ you can 
be pretty sure the justices are expressing an opinion on x.”20 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
There is general agreement that the penalty phase of Texas Gulf 
Sulphur21 was the first time a court determined that the SEC had authority 
to seek disgorgement of a defendant’s ill-gotten gains.22 Securities 
Exchange Act section 27 gives district courts general equity powers in 
civil cases the SEC initiates.23 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, however, defendants 
argued that section 21(e) only authorizes the SEC to seek injunctive relief 
against anyone who is “engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices 
 
18 See U.S. Top Court Questions SEC’s Powers to Recover Ill-Gotten Profits, 23 No. 12 
Westlaw Journal Derivatives 2 (2017). 
19 Morris, supra note 5. 
20 Sam Bray, Equity at the Supreme Court, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 10, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/10/equity-at-the-supreme-
court/.  
21 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 
on other grounds, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971). The liability phase of Texas Gulf Sulphur, of course, 
was the first appellate decision imposing insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5. See SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see 
generally SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 703 (D.D.C. 1978) (describing Texas 
Gulf Sulphur as the “seminal case” in which the “Second Circuit held that liability for insider trading 
violations” arises under Rule 10b-5). In the liability phase Texas Gulf Sulphur decision, the Second 
Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a determination of what penalties and remedies were 
appropriate. See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 842-43 (summarizing remand order). For a 
critique of the liability phase decision, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Bainbridge, Equal Access to 
Information: The Fraud at the Heart of Texas Gulf Sulphur (UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ 
Research Paper No. 17-14, August 7, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3014977. 
22 See, e.g., Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 
BUS. LAW. 317, 320 (2008) (“SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. was the first case in which an appellate 
court recognized the disgorgement remedy and required corporate insiders who traded on material 
nonpublic information to disgorge their illegal trading profits.”); Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the 
SEC's Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1112 n. 32 (2008) (“Texas Gulf 
Sulphur was the first case to determine that the court had the power to grant the ancillary relief of 
disgorgement, thereby depriving defendants of their profits from insider trading.”).  
23 15 U.S.C.S. § 78aa (2017). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/8
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which constitute or will constitute a violation” of the securities laws.24 
Accordingly, they claimed, the SEC lacked authority to seek additional 
equitable relief.25 The Second Circuit disagreed, holding “that the SEC 
may seek other than injunctive relief in order to effectuate the purposes of 
the Act, so long as such relief is remedial relief and is not a penalty 
assessment.”26 The court, further rejecting the defendants’ argument that 
disgorgement acts as a penalty, authorized the SEC to seek disgorgement 
and courts the power to grant it.27 
Why is the SEC’s authority to seek ancillary equitable remedies limited 
by the requirement that they not be penalties? In short, because courts of 
equity lack competence to impose civil penalties: “Remedies intended to 
punish culpable individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to extract 
compensation or restore the status quo, were issued by courts of law, not 
courts of equity.”28 In other words, penalties are legal rather than equitable 
sanctions.29 As such, section 21’s grant of authority to the SEC to seek 
injunctive relief and section 27’s grant of power to the courts to exercise 
equitable jurisdiction are inapposite for penalties.30 Instead, there must be 
an express grant of statutory authority to seek disgorgement as a legal 
sanction,31 and, at the time Texas Gulf Sulphur was decided, no such 
statutory authority existed.32 
Although a number of subsequent congressional enactments touch on a 
 
24 Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1307. See also SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 
1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that “disgorgement may not be used punitively”). 
25 Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1307 (“Appellants contend that, although the district court is 
given general equity powers under [section] 27 of the Act, the SEC does not have authority under the 
Act to seek anything but injunctive relief under [section] 21(e), together with whatever ancillary relief 
is necessary to enforce an injunction, such as the appointment of a receiver.”). 
26 Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1308. 
27 See infra text accompanying note 45. 
28 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987).  
29 See Bray, supra note 20 (stating that “there are no penalties in equity”). 
30 Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND L. REV. 997, 1053 (2015). 
The point is significant because courts continue to draw a sharp line between law and equity. See id. 
(noting that “the expected demise of the line between legal and equitable remedies has not occurred. 
Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court's new equity cases have preserved that line and the doctrines that 
constitute it”).  
31 See, e.g., Am. Bus Assn v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Sentelle, J., concurring). 
(“Congress’s failure to grant an agency a given power is not an ambiguity as to whether that power 
has, in fact, been granted. On the contrary, and as this Court persistently has recognized, a statutory 
silence on the granting of a power is a denial of that power to the agency.”). 
32 David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1219 n.263 (2016).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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disgorgement legal sanction, none are dispositive. Sections 202 and 203 of 
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 
authorize the SEC to seek disgorgement in administrative proceedings, but 
do not settle the question of whether disgorgement sounds in law or 
equity.33 Section 304(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)34 and 
section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 201035 provide for issuers to 
clawback executive compensation under certain circumstances when the 
company has restated its financials. The clawback remedy, however, is 
only weakly analogous to disgorgement and, in any event, does not settle 
the question at hand. SOX section 305(b) authorizes federal courts to grant 
“any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit 
of investors,”36 but that provision obviously does not settle the status of 
disgorgement. 
Congress has also amended Securities Exchange Act section 21 to 
empower courts to impose three tiers of penalties for most securities 
violations. The first tier authorizes a penalty of up to the greater of $5,000 
(for natural persons) or the “gross amount” of the defendant’s “pecuniary 
gain.”37 Tier two authorizes a penalty of up to the greater of $50,000 (for 
natural persons) or the “gross amount” of the defendant’s “pecuniary 
gain.”38 Tier three authorizes a penalty of up to the greater of $100,000 
(for natural persons) or the “gross amount” of the defendant’s “pecuniary 
gain.”39 Each tier thus permits a penalty that is effectively identical to 
disgorgement. Again, however, nothing in this provision address the 
 
33 Pub. L. No. 101-429, §§ 202(a), 203, 104 Stat. 931, 937-39 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78u-2(e), 78u-3(e)). 
34 Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 304, 116 Stat. 745, 778 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243). 
35 Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
36 Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 304, 116 Stat. 745, 778 (2002). 
37 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i). 
38 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(ii). “In the second tier, where the violation ‘involved fraud, deceit, 
manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement,’ the penalty cannot 
exceed the greater of (a) $60,000, or (b) the gross amount of pecuniary gain to the defendant as a result 
of the violation.” S.E.C. v. Colonial Inv. Mgmt. LLC, 659 F. Supp. 2d 467, 502–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), 
aff'd, 381 F. App'x 27 (2d Cir. 2010). 
39 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii). The third “tier applies if the violation involved fraud, deceit, 
manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement, and the violation directly 
or indirectly resulted in substantial losses or created a significant risk of substantial losses to others.” 
Barry W. Rashkover, Fundamentals of SEC Enforcement Defense Practice Outline of Investigative 
and Remedies Issues, 20110311A NYCBAR 698 (2011). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/8
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question at hand.  
Although none of these provisions expressly authorizes the judicially-
created disgorgement sanction,40 they may be cited as evidence that the 
reenactment doctrine validates that sanction:41 
Under this doctrine, long standing court or agency interpretations of 
a statute are deemed to have been approved by Congress if the 
statute to which they apply are reenacted by Congress unchanged. 
When this occurs, those interpretations have the force of law and 
can only be changed by Congress.42  
However, in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A.,43 which involved the scope of the implied private cause of 
action under Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court held that because “Congress 
has not reenacted the language of [section] 10(b) since 1934” the Court 
“need not determine whether the other conditions for applying the 
reenactment doctrine are present.”44 None of the congressional enactments 
discussed above reenacted section 10(b) (or any other relevant provisions 
of the securities laws under which disgorgement has been ordered, for that 
matter). The reenactment doctrine thus cannot replace the missing 
statutory authorization for disgorgement. If disgorgement is to survive as a 
sanction in insider trading and other SEC cases, it must therefore be 
characterized as equitable so as to fall within the powers granted the SEC 
and the courts under sections 21 and 27 of the Securities Exchange Act. 
 
 
 
40 See Francesco A. DeLuca, Sheathing Restitution's Dagger Under the Securities Acts: Why 
Federal Courts Are Powerless to Order Disgorgement in Sec Enforcement Proceedings, 33 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 899, 907 (2014). 
41 In addition, the legislative history of various provisions has occasionally referred with 
seeming approval to the disgorgement sanction. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 355, at 8 (1983) (stating that, 
“in appropriate insider trading cases, the Commission may seek . . . . disgorgement of ill-gotten 
gains”); 150 CONG. REC. S5191-02 (2004). (“In the special case of insider trading, violations result in 
100 percent disgorgement plus a civil fine of up to 300 percent, for a total civil penalty equal to 400 
percent.”). Notice that in the latter case, however, Senator Levin referred to disgorgement as a penalty. 
42 Ward v. C.I.R., 784 F.2d 1424, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986). 
43 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
44 Id. at 185. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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III. IS DISGORGEMENT A LEGAL PENALTY  
OR AN EQUITABLE REMEDY? 
 
The Texas Gulf Sulphur court concluded that disgorgement was not a 
penalty because it “merely deprives” wrongdoers “of the gains of their 
wrongful conduct.”45 The court also rejected defendants’ argument that 
disgorgement in this context was punitive because there was no guarantee 
the money would go to persons who had traded with the defendants. The 
court noted, for example, the potential that at least some of the disgorged 
funds might end up being paid to defendants’ former employer to 
compensate for harm to its reputation.46 
In contrast, the Supreme Court in Kokesh concluded that disgorgement 
is a penalty for three reasons: 
 
1. In cases brought by the SEC, as opposed to those 
brought by private parties, disgorgement is intended to remedy 
a harm to the public at large rather than to recompense specific 
victims.47 
2. The primary purpose of SEC-initiated disgorgement 
proceedings is to deter securities fraud rather than to 
compensate injured parties.48 
3. The proceeds of SEC-initiated disgorgement 
proceedings often go to the government, thus operating as a 
penalty.49 
 
Accordingly, the Court concluded, “SEC disgorgement . . . bears all the 
hallmarks of a penalty: It is imposed as a consequence of violating a 
public law and it is intended to deter, not to compensate.”50 
In addition, the Court rejected the government’s argument that 
disgorgement is remedial because it simply puts the defendant back in the 
 
45 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 1301,1308 (2d Cir. 1971).  
46 Id. 
47 Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643 (2017). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1644. 
50 Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/8
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position “he would have occupied had he not broken the law.”51 In fact, 
disgorgement often leaves the defendant worse off than he would have 
been had he not broken the law: The way disgorgement is measured by 
courts can result in the defendant’s penalty exceeding the economic 
measure of his profit.52 Further, although common law allows a defendant 
to mitigate the amount to be disgorged by taking into account his 
expenses, SEC disgorgement penalties often do not.53 
The Court’s analysis is not a paragon of legal reasoning. First, the 
Court’s three affirmative reasons for treating disgorgement as a penalty 
basically amount to repeating the point that disgorgement is not always 
compensatory. Yet, as the Court acknowledged, the proceeds of many 
disgorgement proceedings ultimately are paid over to the victims of the 
fraud rather than the U.S. Treasury.54 Second, the Court failed utterly to 
grapple with the considerable body of law upon which the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had relied in finding that disgorgement is 
not a penalty within the meaning of section 2462.55 
 
IV. IS DISGORGEMENT ALWAYS A LEGAL PENALTY? 
 
Characterizing disgorgement as a penalty for purposes of section 2462, 
 
51 Id. 
52 See id. (“SEC disgorgement sometimes exceeds the profits gained as a result of the 
violation.”). 
53 Id. 
54 See id. at 1645 (“True, disgorgement serves compensatory goals in some cases . . . .”). 
55 See SEC v. Kokesh, 834 F.3d 1158, 1164-67 (10th Cir. 2016) (discussing authorities), rev’d 
sub nom. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). In addition, the Supreme Court’s opinion wholly 
ignored the much stronger argument that disgorgement in this context operates as a forfeiture, which 
would also subject such proceedings to section 2462. In the lower court, the Tenth Circuit had been 
forced to acknowledge that, as a matter of plain English, the two words “capture similar concepts.” 
Kokesh, 834 F.3d at 1165. It also acknowledged the Eleventh Circuit recently had concluded that 
disgorgement was a forfeiture within the meaning of section 2462. This approach to the problem thus 
offered a much more plausible solution. See generally Jon Eisenberg, Is Disgorgement a “Forfeiture” 
for Statute of Limitations Purposes? HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. & FIN REG. (Mar. 14, 
2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/14/is-disgorgement-a-forfeiture-for-statute-of-
limitations-purposes/. (concluding that “the commonly-understood meaning of ‘forfeiture,’ the 
importance of the policies underlying statutes of limitations, the absence of any basis for 
distinguishing between fines and disgorgement in terms of the policies underlying statutes of 
limitations, the compelling reasons to limit remedies first created by courts rather than Congress, the 
punitive effects of disgorgement on defendants, and even a reasonable definition of ‘penalty’ support 
applying [section] 2462 to SEC disgorgement actions”). 
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as Kokesh did, is not necessarily dispositive. In a future case, the Supreme 
Court could decide that disgorgement is an equitable remedy for some 
purposes and a legal penalty for others.56 For example, although there is no 
constitutional requirement that all laws have a statute of limitations,57 the 
Court might explain that there are important fairness and justice issues that 
distinguish the limitations question from the authority issue.58 There are 
additional reasons to doubt the continuing validity of disgorgement, 
however. 
First, all of the Court’s arguments about the nature of disgorgement 
apply with equal force to the issue of SEC authority and judicial power as 
they do to that of statutes of limitation. Disgorgement as practiced in SEC 
proceedings acts as a punitive sanction intended to deter, regardless of 
whether we are considering applicable statutes of limitation or the 
authority and power issues. Likewise, nothing about shifting the frame of 
analysis from the limitations period to the authority and power perspective 
changes the basic fact that disgorgement as used in SEC cases is intended 
to remedy a harm to the public rather than to compensate specific victims. 
There is no hook in the opinion for distinguishing the two contexts. 
Declaring that disgorgement is punitive for purposes of the statute of 
limitations but not for other purposes thus would require a blatant exercise 
of naked judicial fiat. 
Second, as we saw above, Securities Exchange Act section 21 permits 
the SEC to seek and courts to award penalties that are the functional 
equivalent of disgorgement.59 These provisions thus raise the question of 
 
56 See Dennis J. Wiley, Enforcing Recoupment Provisions After Great-West Life & Annuity 
Insurance Company v. Knudson: A Suggested Method of Analysis for Reviewing Courts, 9 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 1195, 1203 (2006); Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Irreparably Damaged, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 1642, 1648 (1992) (“Characterization as legal or equitable, if necessary for one 
purpose, need not carry over to others.”). 
57 See, e.g., Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (“Their [statutes of 
limitations’] shelter has never been regarded as what now is called a ‘fundamental’ right or what used 
to be called a ‘natural’ right of the individual. He may, of course, have the protection of the policy 
while it exists, but the history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace 
and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control.”). 
58 Indeed, in Kokesh itself, the Court noted that “[s]tatutes of limitations ‘se[t] a fixed date when 
exposure to the specified Government enforcement efforts en[d].’  Such limits are ‘vital to the welfare 
of society’ and rest on the principle that ‘even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be 
forgotten.’” Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1641 (2017). 
59 See supra text accompanying notes 37-39. 
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whether courts should continue to impose a sanction unauthorized by 
statute when an equivalent sanction has been so authorized.60 This 
question is especially pertinent because the logic of the Texas Gulf 
Sulphur decision and its progeny is closely akin to the logic of the early 
Supreme Court decisions creating implied private rights of action under 
the securities laws.61 The latter category of decisions, however, no longer 
have the vitality they possessed when Texas Gulf Sulphur was decided. 
The late Justice Powell argued forcefully that judicial creation of such 
rights: 
allows the Judicial Branch to assume policymaking authority vested 
by the Constitution in the Legislative Branch. It also invites 
Congress to avoid resolution of the often controversial question of 
whether a new regulatory statute should be enforced through private 
litigation. Rather than confronting the hard political choices 
involved, Congress is encouraged to shirk its constitutional 
obligation and leave the issue to the courts to decide. When this 
happens, the legislative process with its public scrutiny and 
participation has been bypassed, with attendant prejudice to 
everyone concerned.62 
Other justices seem to have been persuaded by such concerns, because 
in recent years the “Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to expand 
previously-recognized implied private rights of action or to recognize 
‘new’ implied private rights of action.”63 By undermining the precedents 
upon which Texas Gulf Sulphur relied, this line of Supreme Court cases 
thus necessarily also calls the continuing validity of disgorgement into 
 
60 Cf. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 184 
(1994) (“The fact that Congress chose to impose some forms of secondary liability, but not others, 
indicates a deliberate congressional choice with which the courts should not interfere.”). 
61 See Note, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188, 1190 
(1975) (noting that Texas Gulf Sulphur relied in part on “decisions under the securities acts clarifying 
the scope of remedies in favor of private litigants”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act 
Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 BUS. LAW. 1231, 1254 (1995) (“The Supreme Court for 
many years was in the business of expanding the scope of securities liability through the ready creation 
and broad interpretation of the implied private rights of actions.”). 
62 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
63 Ciliv v. UXB Int'l, Inc., No. 7:12-CV-290, 2012 WL 5245323, at *4 (W.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2012) 
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question.64 
Finally, when considered in light of Supreme Court teaching on the 
scope of the federal courts’ equity jurisdiction, the history of the 
disgorgement remedy suggests that it is not a valid part of that jurisdiction. 
The leading precedent is SEC v. Cavanagh,65 in which the Second Circuit 
correctly recognized that federal courts’ “equity jurisdiction . . . ‘is an 
authority to administer in equity suits the principles of the system of 
judicial remedies [recognized by the] English Court of Chancery at the 
time of the separation of the two countries.’”66 This presented the Second 
Circuit with a problem. As the Supreme Court would later note in Kokesh, 
disgorgement is a relatively new remedy.67 The Second Circuit attempted 
to avoid that problem—and thereby to uphold disgorgement as valid 
within the scope of federal courts’ equity jurisdiction—by analogizing 
disgorgement to remedies that did exist in 1789. 
First. the Cavanagh opinion equated disgorgement to the equitable 
remedy known as accounting, “by which chancery ordered an accounting 
of assets so that wrongly gained profits might be recovered.”68 However, 
the analogy does not hold water. Accounting was a remedy only available 
against persons who has breached a fiduciary duty—a court could not 
order this remedy against a mere wrongdoer.69 
 
64 On the other hand, defenders of disgorgement may argue that it is an established remedy that 
needs neither expansion nor creation and, as such, is not dispositively undermined by the trends in 
implied private rights of action. When one couples Justice Powell’s concerns with bypassing the 
legislative process with the congressional adoption of penalties that are the functional equivalent of 
disgorgement, and the fact that the Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed disgorgement, this 
argument has little traction. 
65 445 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2006). 
66 Id. at 117 (quoting Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 
318 (1999). 
67 See supra text accompanying note 16. 
68 Cavanagh, 445 F.3d at 119. 
69 See DeLuca, supra note 40, at 915 (arguing that “the fiduciary-wrongdoer distinction not only 
damages Cavanagh's analogy between the two remedies but also undermines Cavanagh's entire 
mission”). It is true, of course, that liability for insider trading is premised on fiduciary or similar 
relationship of trust and confidence. Simon DeBartolo Grp., L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Grp., Inc., 186 
F.3d 157, 171–72 (2d Cir. 1999). The same is not true of other securities violations for which 
disgorgement may be imposed as a remedy, because it may be imposed against wrongdoers generally. 
See, e.g., SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (“As an exercise of its equity 
powers, the court may order wrongdoers to disgorge their fraudulently obtained profits.”). In addition, 
there are various circumstances in which insider trading liability is imposed even in the absence of a 
fiduciary relationship. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND POLICY 168-74 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/8
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Second, the Cavanagh opinion analogized disgorgement to a 
constructive trust.70 Again, however, the analogy fails. One type of 
constructive trust is used so that beneficiaries may recover from assets 
purloined by a fiduciary, as well as any gains traceable to their use, which 
is inapt with respect to insider trading.71 The other type of constructive 
trust, which is used as a remedy for unjust enrichment, did not exist in 
1789.72 
Finally, the Cavanagh opinion analogized disgorgement to restitution.73 
Once more, the analogy is flawed. Restitution is a generic term that can be 
characterized as legal or equitable depending on the nature of the claim 
and the relief being sought.74 As a result, “the analogy to ‘restitution’ is 
circular and unhelpful.”75 
In addition, all three of the Cavanagh analogies are compensatory 
remedies. The primary purpose of disgorgement in SEC cases, however, is 
deterrence.76 Accordingly, the amount a defendant must disgorge need not 
be the same as the loss suffered by the victims of defendant’s misconduct 
and, more importantly, disgorgement may be ordered even if none of the 
funds will be paid out to harmed investors.77 All of the analogies offered 
by the Cavanagh court thus are inapt. 
In sum, as my former colleague Sam Bray observes: 
There is no equitable remedy of disgorgement. There are a number 
of equitable remedies that are restitutionary, such as the 
constructive trust, accounting for profits and equitable lien. . . . But 
 
(2014) (identifying such circumstances). 
70 Cavanagh, 445 F.3d at 119. 
71 See DeLuca, supra note 40, at 917 (describing an institutional constructive trust). 
72 Id. at 918-919. 
73 Cavanagh, 445 F.3d at 119. 
74 Reich v. Continental Casualty Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that 
“restitution is a legal remedy when ordered in a case at law and an equitable remedy . . . when ordered 
in an equity case”). 
75 DeLuca, supra note 40, at 920. 
76 See, e.g., SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The primary purpose of 
disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the securities laws by depriving violators of their ill-
gotten gains.”); SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1096 (2d Cir. 1987) (“The paramount purpose of . . . 
ordering disgorgement is to make sure that wrongdoers will not profit from their wrongdoing.”). 
77 See Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d at 176 (holding that “the measure of disgorgement need not be 
tied to the losses suffered by defrauded investors . . . and a district court may order disgorgement 
regardless of whether the disgorged funds will be paid to such investors as restitution”). 
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“disgorgement” isn’t one of those remedies. The word does not 
even appear in Pomeroy’s treatise on equity . . . . In older sources, 
the verb disgorge is occasionally used, and more rarely 
disgorgement will be used as a nontechnical term (cf. the cognates 
repay and repayment). Maybe “disgorgement” is a good term for a 
sui generis restitutionary remedy created by statute. But there is no 
equitable or common law remedy of “disgorgement.”78 
As a result, it will require quite a feat of judicial legerdemain for the 
Supreme Court to validate disgorgement when the issue next comes before 
it. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Texas Gulf Sulphur and it progeny base the SEC’s authority to seek and 
the court’s power to impose disgorgement on the claim that it is a form of 
equitable ancillary relief. If disgorgement is a penalty, however, courts 
lack that power and the SEC lacks that authority. This conclusion follows 
necessarily from the basic premise that there are no penalties in equity and 
the complete absence of any statutory authority to impose disgorgement as 
a legal sanction. 
The Supreme Court has now made clear that disgorgement is, in fact, a 
penalty. Although not dispositive of the question, when coupled with the 
other reasons to doubt the validity of the disgorgement sanction, the future 
of the disgorgement penalty therefore looks bleak, notwithstanding the 
disclaimer in Kokesh footnote three. 
 
 
78 Bray, supra note 20. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/8
